Russia is seeing a potential challenge emerging to Putinism, but it is coming from the unlikeliest of places: instead of pro-Western liberals, it is the nationalists, ones whom the Kremlin tried, but failed, to court, who are offering an alternative political vision. To a large extent, this is Vladimir Putin’s own fault. He has created a toxic and dangerous dichotomy in emerging Russian politics, one that has been thrown into sharp relief by the renewed drive for the creation of a nationalist opposition movement. Any wellsprings of genuine liberalism as understood in the West have been systematically poisoned or dammed by the Kremlin. Meanwhile, the dominant domestic model of economically liberal politics is championed by kleptocrats who are invested in better relations with the West but, for all their talk of rule of law at home, want to retain their freedom to steal.
Much as the West may approve of such figures as former finance minister Alexei Kudrin, former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov, and current first deputy prime minister Igor Shuvalov, seeing in their pragmatic reform-minded figures, their stock inside Russia is rather lower. Kudrin is associated with extreme fiscally conservatism, and an almost neo-conservative “tough love” that would see ordinary Russians suffer in the name of economic theory. Opposition leader Kasyanov is still in the popular imagination “Misha Two Percent” for the cut he was meant to take from major deals while he was in office. As for Shuvalov, while a well-educated, cosmopolitan and business-friendly figure, he is doing conspicuously well out of the current system, reportedly even using a private business jet to ferry his pet dogs around.
Rightly or wrongly, whatever the virtues of individual figures, there is a widespread belief that the liberal elite are self-interested and downright corrupt, eager to uphold Western values so long as it benefits them. In the words of one senior Moscow police officer, a self-described “nationalist convert,” the country has an elite which “is divided between those who cross themselves and steal while praising Mother Russia, and those who speak English and steal while praising the West. But they all steal, and they are none of them patriots.” There are, of course, exceptions, but ironically, as a result it is figures within a broad nationalist spectrum, who are amongst those talking most loudly about the need for rule of law, an independent judiciary, transparent ownership of assets, and a fight against corruption. On one end they are best represented by Alexei Navalny, but on the other are figures such as Igor Girkin, better known by his nom de guerre Strelkov, outsiders in a Russia that would seem in many ways to reflect their values.
This paradox reflects an ideological void, or at least uncertainty at the heart of ‘Putinism.’ There can be no doubt that Putin is a nationalist: he is a Russian exceptionalist who believes there is something precious, unique and glorious about his country’s culture, history and civilization. As such, it is likely genuine belief and not just Realpolitik that lies behind his efforts to assert Russia’s voice in the world and fight back what he considers to be Western efforts to export its values and, in the process, undermine Russia’s distinctiveness. As he put in in the run-up to the last presidential election: “We are fortifying our state-civilization…, binding this unique civilization together is the great mission of the Russian people.” But what does this mean? There lies the problem. Putin’s nationalism continues to be protean, unclear, for all his evident passion. This is not just the basic division between ethnic-Russian and state-Russian models of nationalism, it is about what truly serves Russia best. In the absence of such a clear vision – and so long as the state over which Putin presides continues largely to be staffed by kleptocrats and opportunists who mouth the words to the national anthem while abusing its laws and skimming its budget – then the only real space for nationalism to be explored properly is in opposition. The irony is thus that while the Kremlin periodically has sought to co-opt and control various nationalist movements, it may also be contributing to the emergence of forces which, while they may never bring down the current regime, may get to define its successor.
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