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THE KREMLIN’S IRREGULAR ARMY: UKRAINIAN SEPARATIST ORDER OF BATTLE




The Kremlin’s political-military campaign in Eastern Ukraine threatens both Kyiv and the rest of Europe three years after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. The Kremlin – in violation of its obligations under the ‘Minsk II’ ceasefire agreements – has fueled the conflict in pursuit of its grand strategic objective to assert dominance over the former Soviet Union. Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown no desire to withdraw his forces despite his failure to develop proxy forces capable of independently extending his campaign of subversion across Ukraine. Putin will continue to extend and exploit the war to destabilize Ukraine and prevent its further integration with the West until faced with costs that change his calculus. This paper demonstrates that Russia’s proxy forces operating in Eastern Ukraine - the Donetsk (DNR) and Luhansk (LNR) Peoples’ Republics - continue to pose a threat to the security of Ukraine and Europe. These proxies only retain the capability to fight the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) with the sustained backing of the Kremlin. Russia continues to push its false narrative of a ‘civil war’ in Ukraine when the conflict is - and always has been - a product of its own intervention.

 The war is driven by Russia’s proxy forces, facilitated by its nationwide subversion campaign, and actively supported by its troops. This paper also outlines the lessons learned from the invasion of Ukraine for both the West and the Kremlin. Ukraine ousted pro-Russian Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych in the pro-Western 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, removing itself from the control of Moscow.

1 This development threatened Putin’s long-held plans to dominate the states of the former Soviet Union via an economically viable and politically subordinate Eurasian Economic Union.

2 The Kremlin perceived the Euromaidan Revolution as the latest “coup d’état” in a string of revolutions backed by the West against Moscow rather than as what it was: a popular protest movement driven by Ukrainians’ increasing frustration with a corrupt, inefficient, and abusive government.

3 Putin assessed the need for immediate action to topple the pro-Western Government of Ukraine and restore his control over the country after his forces invaded and illegally occupied the Crimean Peninsula. Russia began military operations in spring 2014 in Eastern Ukraine that aimed to spread chaos via armed militants in pursuit of this objective.

by Franklin Holcomb

http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Separatist%20ORBAT%20Holcomb%202017_Final.pdf


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